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THE TWILIGHT ZONE OF HEARSAY
RICHMOND RUCKER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The twilight zone of hearsay and nonhearsay has provoked searching
analyses by eminent authorities in the field of evidence.1 Although
these contributions have doubtless been of inestimable value, exerting
a profound influence in the solution of problems dealing with acts and
utterances within this area of proof, there is much to be desired in
the way of clarity as reflected by innumerable opinions of the courts.
No fatuous notion is here entertained that within the limits of this
discussion order will be rescued from chaos, or for that matter that
an appreciable contribution will be made toward that end. Never-
theless, it is hoped that this article will stimulate additional interest
in the solution of some of the problems that have been raised.
No purpose would be served in referring to the historical background
and development of the doctrines and rules involved, which have been
painstakingly and masterfully treated by Wigmore, Morgan, and
others.2 The approach made here to the questions concerning acts and
utterances with relation to this area of proof emphasizes the actualities
of the situations presented, somewhat irrespective of the ratio
decidendi of the particular cases in which they occur. Although,
as hereinafter observed, nonverbal and verbal acts are closely related,
sharing in common certain fundamental attributes, a dichotomy will
be made between the two groups of acts. In some instances words are
less ambiguous than acts; in other instances acts are more persuasive
than words. Moreover, the distinction between nonverbal and verbal
acts finds justification from the decisions of the courts and as the
ensuing discussion of cases indicates, is not merely arbitrary.
II. NONVERBAL ACTS
1. Preliminary Observations
The hearsay rule becomes operative whenever the truth of a matter
stated out of court is brought into question. Conversely, if the truth
*Member, Ingle, Rucker & Ingle, Winston-Salem, North Carolina; author,
pocket supplements to current edition of Wigmore's Evidence.
1. Hinton, States of Mind and the Hearsay Rule, 1 U. CI' L. REv. 394
(1934); McCormick, The Borderland of Hearsay, 39 YALE L.J. 489 (1930);
Morgan, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay, 48 HARv. L. REV. 1138 (1935); Morgan,
Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARv. L.
REV. 177 (1948); Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible
as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229 (1922).
2. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1364 (3d ed. 1940) (hereinafter cited WIGMORE);
6 id. § 1767. See also articles, note 1 supra.
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of the matter stated out of court is not brought into question, the
hearsay rule is inapplicable. Thus far, it would appear we are on solid
ground. There seems to be complete concinnity on the part of the
courts and the authorities as. to these hypotheses. Let us now consider
whether or not hearsay may include nonverbal acts (conduct).
Undoubtedly, a nod of the head in answer to a question calling for
a "yes" or "no" answer is invaribly treated in the ordinary affairs of
life as the equivalent of the assertion, "yes." Again, the symbol of the
buyer's bid at a tobacco warehouse sale is regarded as the equivalent
of an assertion of a willingness to buy at a certain price. Thus it is
manifest that assertions or their equivalent are not confined to oral
or written statements but may include acts; i.e., assertions may be
implied from nonverbal acts under some conditions. That being true,
it follows as a matter of course that a nonverbal act may constitute
hearsay. Before considering under what conditions nonverbal acts
constitute hearsay or create hearsay dangers, it is perhaps desirable
to direct attention to a formidable question raised with regard
to the nature of hearsay.
Mr. Eustace Seligman, in a penetrating and analytical article,
contends that hearsay involves the communication of thought.3 While
unquestionably in the vast majority of instances such an hypothesis
is true, it is not necessarily true in every case. In this connection
Professor Morgan 4 has pointedly observed that an utterance or state-
ment is not shorn of its quality as hearsay by virtue of the fact that it
was not intended as a communication of thought. The writer of a letter
decides not to mail it; instead he files it away. After his death, it is
found among his papers. That portion of the letter narrating a series
of events constitutes hearsay. A soliloquy in the wilderness, the
declarant being unaware that his statement is being heard, may never-
theless constitute hearsay. But suppose the statement thus made in
the wilderness, the declarant being unaware of anyone in hearing
distance, is in fact the lines of a play he was rehearsing. Would such
a statement constitute hearsay? It would not. It is, therefore,
urged that while perhaps in the vast majority of cases the expressed
or implied intent of the actor to convey thought may be determinative
of whether or not hearsay is involved, it is by no means an invariable
criterion for making such determination. As Professor Morgan 5 has
stressed, with respect to both nonverbal and verbal acts, the all-im-
portant formula never to be lost sight of is that whenever the truth of
3 Seligman, An Exception to the Hearsay Rule,. 26 HAv. L. Rv. 146 (1912).
4. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and- the Application of the Hearsay Concept,
62 HARv. L. REv. 177, 189 (1948).
5. Morgan, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay, 48 Htv. L. REv. 1138 (1935); Mor-
gan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 IHAnv.
L. Rsv. 177 (1948); Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admis-
sible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229 (1922).
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the matter asserted out of court is called into question, the hearsay rule
is involved--otherwise not. With these observations in mind, let us
turn our attention to specific instances of nonverbal acts with a view
of ascertaining whether or not they involve hearsay or hearsay
dangers.
It is thought that the notable illustrations employed by the court
in the celebrated case of Wright v. Tatham6 admirably answers
this purpose. In that case the mental capacity of the testator was in
issue. Letters sent to the testator were offered in evidence on that
issue. Although these letters did not allude to the mental capacity of
the addressee to handle his own affairs, the contents of the letters
were such as one would expect to be addressed to a person of mental
capacity sufficient for the execution of a will. The proponent, there-
fore, contended that a reasonable inference was justified from the act
of sending any one of the letters to the testator that the addressor
believed that the addressee was of sound mind and capable of attend-
ing to his affairs. While some question has been raised as to whether
the actual decision rendered by the court was not based on the
hypothesis that the introduction of the letters would constitute an
infraction of the opinion rule, the court emphasized their hearsay
aspect by use of the following illustrations:
7
(1) payment by the underwriters of the amount of a policy as an
implied statement that the ship was lost;
(2) payment of a wager as an implied statement that the event
which was the subject of the wager occurred;
(3) precaution taken by the family with respect to a member as an
implied statement that such member was insane;
(4) election of a person to high office as implying the statements
of the voters that they believed such person to be sane;
(5) conduct on the part of an attending physician in permitting the
patient to execute a will as an implied assertion of the physician that he
regarded the testator to be mentally competent and capable of execut-
ing a will;
(6) the act of a ship captain, after examining a vessel, in embarking
thereon with his family as an implied statement by him that the
vessel was seaworthy.
Each of these hypothetical situations was thought to be the equiva-
lent of an implied out-of-court assertion as to the truth of such implied
utterance, and, therefore, hearsay. The argument is meretricious, but
not convincing. What basis is there for assuming that the acts,
respectively, implied an assertion on the part of the actor? Or, for
6. 7 Ad. & El. 313, 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (Ex. 1834), aff'd, 5 Cl. & F. 670, 7




that matter, what basis is there for attributing to such acts the equiva-
lent of an assertion on the part of the actor? It is earnestly maintained
that there was no basis for assuming that the acts in the hypothetical
cases were either implied assertions or their equivalent. Surely, it
cannot be successfully contended that any one of these hypothetical
situations may be assimilated to the nod of the head in answer to a
question. The nod of the head is merely symbolical of an assertion.
Can any one of these situations be said to be symbolical of an assertion?
Nor are they analogous to the soliloquy in the wilderness. While it
might be said that that situation has, in common with these hypotheti-
cal cases, the feature of a lack of intention to convey thought, the
soliloquy was a verbal act. It is one thing to draw an inference from
an act, such as an inference of a belief; quite another to attribute an
assertion to another from the act. To say that the actor impliedly
asserted a particular fact is quite different from saying that an
inference may be drawn as to his mental state or condition from such
act. The act of the captain, after inspecting the vessel, of embarking
thereon with his family is clearly susceptible of the inference that he
entertained the belief that the vessel was seaworthy. But to go
further and attribute to the captain, on the basis of his acts, an implied
assertion as to the seaworthiness of the vessel simply does not coinside
with the incidents of such an experience in the ordinary affairs of life.
Again, while payment of the wager is clearly susceptible of the
inference that the payer believed that the event which was the subject
of the bet had taken place, it does not follow that the payer impliedly
stated his belief by such payment. The doctrine of judicial notice
demonstrates rather conclusively that the courts are prone to abide
by the normal experiences of mankind. Otherwise, the ultimate
objective in dispensing justice would be frustrated.8 In a similar way,
according to the normal experiences of mankind, no implied assertion
can be reasonably inferred from the illustrative cases.
Before proceeding further, let us pause to take into account the
observation of Vaughn, J., who concurred in the opinion of Baron Parke
in Wright v. Tatham, with reference to the rule therein laid down and
its application:
They [acts] may be acts involving a great sacrifice of personal interest,
as, the payment of a policy of insurance by an underwriter, on a marine
loss; and therefore, as moral evidence, they may be very cogent. Yet
does the law, more rigid and inflexible, resist the weight of such moral
evidence, although, in the ordinary transactions of life, common sense
and experience might possibly yield to it.9
8. See Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 CoLum. L. REV. 945 (1955); McCormick,
Judicial Notice, 5 VAND. L. REv. 296 (1952); Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HAnV.
L. REV. 269 (1944).
9. 5 Cl. & F. at 739. (Emphasis added.)
[ VOL. 9
TWILIGHT ZONE OF HEARSAY
Thus, with apparent misgiving, the learned justice felt constrained
to apply a rule of precedent which resisted moral evidence and possibly
ran counter to "common sense and experience" as gleaned from "the
ordinary transactions of life."
Moreover no comfort may be derived by those who advocate the
conclusions of Baron Parke with respect to these cases on the theory
that the acts are the equivalent of such contended assertions. No
circumvention of this sort is available. So-called hearsay dangers,
which consist of: (1) lack of observation; (2) lack of memory; (3)
faulty narration, and (4) lack of truthfulness, are not as formidable
with reference to acts involving conduct as they are in cases of
assertions offered to prove the truth of the matter stated.10
It is a daily experience in the trial of cases for witnesses to testify
to the occurrence of acts coming within their observation. Once it is
shown that the witness, not being under disability either at the time
of the occurrence or at the time of trial (assumed in absence of
circumstances to the contrary), was afforded the opportunity to observe
and did observe the occurrence, his testimony in regard thereto is
admissible. Under those conditions other evidence challenging the
observation of the witness usually goes to credibility rather than to
admissibility. Whether the one whose act is narrated lacked observa-
tion would depend upon the surrounding circumstances. Surely, a
most extraordinary situation would be necessary to create the hearsay
danger of lack of observation.
Similarly, as the second hearsay danger, lack of memory, usually
affects the credibility and not the admissibility of testimony in the
trial of cases with reference to acts other than human conduct, no
reason suggests itself why the latter-i.e. ,testimony with reference to
human acts-should be relegated to a less favorable position. It is
difficult to conceive of a situation where the question of the actor's
memory would be raised.
Faulty narration is far less likely to occur in relating an act than in
recounting an oral assertion. In most instances, the witness does not
undertake to quote literally what was said by another, but rather
to give his interpretation of what was said. Therefore, it would seem
the hearsay danger of faulty narration, which is apparent in every
case where the witness professes to relate what was said by another,
has no efficacy in cases of proof of human conduct, or at least no more
force than in those instances in which the witness is narrating his
personal observations.
Finally, the hearsay danger of lack of truthfulness, it is submitted,
is likewise deserving of no more weight. While exceptional instances
might conceivably arise of fraudulent use of conduct for the purpose
10. See Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay
Concept, 62 HARv. L. REv. 177 (1948).
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of deception, such a charge is rarely made with reference to this type
of evidence. The attendant risks of disclosure from the other facts and
circumstances of the case doubtless inhibit the extensive use of such
evidence by those engaging in deceitful practices.
From the foregoing illustrations, in particular of nonaction, it is
not to be implied that the admission of such testimony is here
advocated. At this point it is contended merely that neither hearsay
nor the dangers of hearsay present a formidable barrier to the testi-
mony. A consideration of the basis for the hearsay rule should throw
some light upon the problem.
Cross-examination has for a long time been recognized by the courts
as a most effective means of developing the truth in the trial of a
cause. 11 Accordingly, the lack of opportunity for such cross-examina-
tion is unquestionably the principal reason for the existence of the
rule against hearsay. It would seem to follow, therefore, that in a
situation where the cross-examination could be said to be of no value
to the opponent, the rule of exclusion having thus collapsed of its own
weight, the evidence should be admitted. And, of course, by like
reason, if it is obvious that the cross-examination would be of ques-
tionable benefit to the opponent, the court in a borderline case should
take this factor into account in making the decision. In the absence
of some information that the underwriters paid the amount of the
policy on the loss of the ship in consequence of fraud or a mistake of
fact, would it amount to a rash assumption that cross-examination of
the underwriters would probably afford the opponent slight comfort?
In fact, is it not true that during the course of the investigation of such
a lawsuit a check-up would be made as to the circumstances surround-
ing the payment? Therefore, if some doubt was cast with reference
to the payment, the opponent could avail himself of the underwriter
as a witness at the trial or by deposition. In the case where the
testator's mental capacity was questioned inquiries would no doubt
be made of the attending physician. Both parties would no doubt
seek an interview. The proponent would doubtless call him as a
witness or procure his deposition. Suppose, however, the physician
died before a deposition was taken. Evidence that he permitted the
testator to sign the will would probably be attended by other circum-
stances exposing the error committed by him if he made error in
permitting the testator to sign the will. From these observations
it is not to be inferred that any withdrawal is intended from the
position hereinabove taken with respect to these hypothetical cases
enumerated in Wright v. Tatham. Moreover, the doctrine of harm-
less error is not being invoked. The thesis here advanced is that
where evidence of an act closely approximates an assertion and there-
11. 5 WIGMoRE § 1367; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and Non-Hearsay, 48
HARV. L. Rsv. 1138 (1935).
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fore might offend the hearsay rule, the court might well consider the
end the hearsay rule is designed to effect in the light of the circum-
stances presented.
It has been noted that nonverbal acts may amount to or be the
equivalent of hearsay. The nod of the head in response to a question
calling for an affirmative or negative answer is an illustration of this
situation. Nevertheless, disagreement has been found in this article
with the noteworthy examples of nonverbal acts which were desig-
nated as hearsay or the equivalent thereof by Baron Parke in
Wright v. Tatham. It would seem to follow that any doubt arising
from the possible applicability of the hearsay rule or a danger there-
from should call for the reception of the evidence. Manifestly, the
nonverbal illustrations employed in Wright v. Tatham, as hereinabove
indicated, are more clearly within the periphery of conduct rather
than of implied assertions. "Actions speak louder than words." Yes!
Usually they involve a much higher degree of credibility. Both courts
and ordinary persons rely heavily 'upon probabilities, predicated, of
course, upon experience. While a high degree of certainty as to the
statement of a rule of evidence is desirable, justice should not be
sacrificed for certainty, and due weight should be accorded probability.
Rules are merely the means of attaining the ultimate, the dispensing
of justice; they are not in themselves the ultimate. The empirical
process employed in the development of the law of evidence draws
constantly from the storehouse of everyday experience.
2. Active and Inactive Conduct (Silence)
The problem arises as to what distinguishing features, if any, exists
between active and inactive conduct with relation to hearsay.12 A
cursory examination of some of the decisions of the courts should, it
would seem, afford a desirable approach to the problem. First, let us
make note of cases involving active nonverbal conduct.
In Thompson v. Manhattan Ry.,13 the plaintiff sought to recover
for injuries to her spine. Evidence that her attending physician
treated her for such injuries was excluded, on the ground that such
evidence was the equivalent of the physician's but-of-court assertion
that plaintiff suffered an injury to her spine. t
Nevertheless, in an action by a veteran to recover for tuburcular
disability, his testimony that in the hospital he was transferred to the
tuberculosis ward was allowed in United States v. Sessin.14
In McCurdy v. Flibotte,15 an action of negligence arising out of an
12. See Falknor, Silence as Hearsay, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 192, 194 (1940).
13. 11 App. Div. 182, 42 N.Y. Supp. 896 (2d Dep't. 1896).
14. 84 F.2d 667 (10th Cir. 1936).
15. 83 N.H. 143, 139 Atl. 367 (1927).
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automobile collision, cross-examination of the driver of one of the
cars as to whether his driver's license had been revoked was excluded
as hearsay.
On the other hand in Meserve v. Folsom,16 upon the issue of plaintiff's
domicil, cross-examination of the plaintiff by defendent as to whether
he was permitted to vote at the place which he claimed to be his
residence was allowed. Powers, J., disposed of the hearsay objection
to the testimony as follows:
It is now argued that this question called for the action of the board of
civil authority, and this was hearsay evidence. But the question was not
admitted for the purpose of proving what the board said or did respecting
the plaintiff's residence in Sutton. It was admitted to show a fact; to show
that one of the characteristics of residence was lacking."
In Daly v. Publix Cars,8 an action for personal injuries was brought
by the passengers against the operator of a taxicab in consequence of
a collision between the cab and an automobile. Evidence that the
driver of the automobile paid darhages sustained by the taxicab was
excluded.
The issue of survivorship between two persons killed in the same
train wreck was presented in the case of In re Louck's Estate.0
Witness' testimony that one of the victims was placed on a stretcher
and the other was not was excluded.
It is apparent from these cases that there is no uniformity of holdings
under similar factual situations.20 There are, however, two groups of
cases relating to (1) belief with reference to family matters, and (2)
implied admissions discrediting a party or witness in which the admis-
sion of similar testimony is allowed.21 As not infrequently verbal and
nonverbal acts appear in the same case and are treated indiscriminately
by the courts, no point is seen in doing other than alluding to these
cases particularly in the light of a seeming concinnity among the
decisions in dealing with this group of situations.
Let us now briefly examine those cases within the ambit of inactive
nonverbal conduct (silence).
In George W. Saunders Live Stock Commission Co. v. Kincaid,22 an
issue was raised as to the soundness of hogs sold to packers. Testimony
of the seller that he had received no complaints from others to whom
he had sold hogs of the same shipment was excluded as hearsay.
Yet, in Katz v. Delohery Hat Co.,23 evidence that no complaints had
16. 62 Vt. 504, 20 At. 926 (1890).
17. 20 Ati. at 928.
18. 128 Neb. 403, 259 N.W. 163 (1935).
19. 160 Cal. 551, 117 Pac. 673 (1911).
20. See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 229 n.15 (1954).
21. 2 WIGMOlE § 267.
22. 168 S.W. 977 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
23. 97 Conn. 665, 118 Atl. 88 (1922).
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been received about fur from the same lot as that from which the
buyer had purchased was admitted.
In Sullivan v. Minneapolis 'St. Ry.,2 4 a passenger on a street car
sought to recover for personal injuries. Testimony offered by the
defendant that no other claim was made against it resulting from the
occasion in question was held admissible, as within the discretion of
the trial court, in view of the crowded condition of the car. It is to be
observed, however, that the court made no allusion to the hearsay
aspect of the evidence, but rather directed its attention to materiality
and relevancy.
Likewise in Segars v. City of Cornelia25 the testimony of a husband
that his wife had said nothing to him about signing an easement,
although they invariably discussed business matters between them-
selves, was held inadmissible.
But in Latham v. Houston Land & Trust Co.,26 where the existence
of a trust fund was in issue, testimony of the widow of and the attorney
for the alleged settlor, since deceased, and others to whom he would
likely have mentioned the matter, that they had never heard him say
anything with reference to the existence of such a trust was received.
Indisputably, these inactive nonverbal conduct cases share in
common with the active nonverbal conduct cases a varied treatment
at the hands of the courts. One experiences a sort of phantasmagoria
in reviewing the cases within the periphery of inactive conduct (sil-
ence). Not infrequently, in these silence cases, the court disposes of
the question of admissibility by excluding the evidence on the ground
of lack of relevancy,27 and in this connection, "materiality" and
''competency" are often seemingly employed synonymously with
relevancy. Be that as it may, let us examine more closely this inactive
nonverbal conduct with reference to hearsay or hearsay dangers.
Occasionally, the inactive nonverbal conduct may approach closely
an implied negative assertion. For example, A sells goods to B from
a lot or bulk. On the same day from that same lot he sells quantities
of the goods to C, D, E, F, and G. 'B brings an action against A for
breach of warranty of quality in the sale of the merchandise. A
proposes to testify about the other sales to C, D, E, F, and G and to the
further fact that none of them had complained to him as to the quality
of the goods.
At the outset, it should be observed that the proffered testimony
might well be excluded on the ground of lack of relevancy. C might
refrain from complaining because of his friendship with A. D might
experience some embarrassment in this connection because of the
24. 161 Minn. 45, 200 N.W. 922 (1924).
25. 60 Ga. App. 457, 4 S.E.2d 60 (1939).
26. 62 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
27. See MCCORMCK, EVIDENCE § 229 n.28 (1954).
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liberal credit extended him by A on other occasions. In the same
case E intended to call A's attention to the inferior quality of the
goods but delayed in doing so and subsequently sold them to Y at a
substantial profit. Thus it is apparent that the silence of the pur-
chasers gives rise to a wide range of inferences. Moreover, it is
likewise apparent that the receipt of A's testimony would invite an
investigation of the various circumstances impelling silence on the
part of the respective purchasers; this investigation in turn would be
calculated to create a confusion of issues.
Passing over relevancy, let us now examine the hearsay aspect of
the proffered testimony. Suppose B testifies that some few days after
the delivery of the goods purchased from A, he met A on the street
and told him that the goods did not come up to warranty in quality,
to which A made no reply. Would it be seriously contended that B's
testimony was inadmissible? Does it not show conduct on the part of
A, being equivalent to, if not in fact, an implied admission? Would
not X, a reasonably intelligent person who was present, in narrating
this occurrence, probably describe A's silence by saying that "A
agreed that the goods were not as warranted" or "A certainly implied
that the goods were inferior"? But going back to A's proffered
testimony that the other purchasers did not complain of the quality
of the merchandise, this testimony would not come within the scope of
an implied admission, because admissions (express or implied) apply
to parties and their privies, only.28 Nonetheless, although the silence
of these purchasers does not qualify as an implied admission, what is
to prevent this silence being dealt with as an implied assertion?
May it not be said that any conduct of a party to a cause tending to
show the weakness of his position either as plaintiff or as defendant
is generally spoken of as implied admission? In other words, the term
"implied admission" in this sense may include, but does not necessarily
include, an implied assertion. 29 From this observation, it is not to be
inferred that any puristic approach to the problem of the nature of
conduct against the interest of a party or otherwise is here advocated.
The importance, however, of taking note that such a term as "implied
admission" is not to be taken literally and that the language of the
court must be construed in the light of the facts presented is here
stressed. With these cautions in mind let us proceed with the
situation presented.
Silence of the purchasers, whether they are parties or not, suggests
to a varying degree, depending upon the attendant circumstances, the
same underlying notion of conduct against interest.30 It would seem
to follow, therefore, that such silent conduct against the interest of
28. 4 WiGmoRE §§ 1048, 1076.
29. 4 id. § 1060.
30. See 2 id. § 277.
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the person refraining from speech is entitled to a higher degree of
trustworthiness than where this against interest factor did not exist.
The practical difficulty lies in the determination of whether the silent
conduct was, in fact, or, perhaps more accurately stated, could rea-
sonably have been thought of by the silent person as against his
interest. Therefore, when A proposes to testify that the purchasers
of the goods other than B made no complaint, such testimony, in the
absence of additional facts, would have little weight and, therefore,
correspondingly a small degree of trustworthiness. Additional cir-
cumstances indicating that a person in the position of one of the
purchasers would protest if the goods were inferior and that the
purchaser did not would add to the strength of the silent conduct.
In doubtful situations where much is left to conjecture as to the
significance to be attached to the silent conduct, it would seem to be
sound policy to exclude the evidence.3' For example, in Lake Drainage
Commissioners v. Spencer32 the issue arose as to whether the de-
fendants' mother had been served with summons. Testimony of the
defendants that they had never heard her say anything about the
service of summons was held inadmissible. The court assimilated such
testimony to hearsay. The aspect of the silence as being against the
interest of the mother was not alluded to in the opinion of the court.
To speculate as to whether such silence on the mother's part should
be construed as likely to be against her interest, or rather whether she
thought so, or not, seems of slight value in the solution of the problem
of admissibility. The reasoning of the court in that case would seem
to support the hypothesis that inactive nonverbal conduct (silence)
runs afoul of hearsay. Does such a hypothesis tally with experiences
in the ordinary affairs of life? Does not much depend upon the
setting or surrounding circumstances? In that case, it seems doubtful
that the mother's conduct (silence) should have been treated as
hearsay, the attendant circumstances being insufficient to raise an
inference of an implied assertion. Exclusion of the testimony as to
her silence could, it would appear, have been more effectively placed
upon the ground of relevancy. Her silence might have been attributed
to many factors, such as forgetfulness, assumption that the children
knew of the service of process, reluctance to bring up an unpleasant
subject, and others. Granting, however, that the barrier of relevancy
is overcome, the question of whether she probably knew that silence
was in derogation of her interest is left to speculation. That being
true, it would seem to follow that a court adopting the theory of the
detriment concept as a factor to be considered in determining the
existence of an implied assertion or at least the equivalent of hearsay
31. This position is perhaps a slight departure from the one advocated by
Professor Falknor, supra note 12, at 215.
32. 174 N.C. 36, 93 S.E. 435 (1917).
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should have no difficulty in disposing of this factor on the ground
that no evidence was offered in support of the existence of such a
detriment.
The foregoing observations demonstrate the intricacies attending
the perplexing problem of hearsay or a hearsay equivalent in these
cases of silence. Many of the inconsistencies in the decisions are
probably as much attributable to inarticulation as to articulation. In
Fogg v. Oregon Short Line R. R.,33 the plaintiff claimed compensation
for an injured knee. The defendant contended that the injured knee
was the result of a prior accident and introduced plaintiff's statement
that he had had such an accident in support thereof. In rebuttal,
testimony was elicited from plaintiff's wife that he had not complained
of an injured knee growing out of the prior accident. The appellate
court, in affirming the admission of this evidence, referred to the
admissibility of declarations of present pain or suffering. In effect,
the court seemed to say that even if the wife's testimony was hearsay,
nevertheless it was admissible as a logical extension of the exception
to the hearsay rule relating to present pain and suffering. What do we
glean from these nonverbal inactive (silence) cases with relation to
hearsay?
In many instances silence under appropriate circumstances ap-
proaches, if it does not- in fact constitute an implied assertion, i.e.,
hearsay. Such a situation is perhaps more prevalent in inactive non-
verbal conduct cases than in those of active nonverbal conduct. If a
hearsay clash is encountered, there is the possibility of some exception
being applicable. While the factor of detriment may be helpful in
arriving at a particular determination, the basic thesis involves the
application of the common experience of mankind (judicial notice)
to the facts of the case. Any attempt to categorize the cases, for
example, into those with reference to sales of goods, injuries sustained,
service of summons, etc., is thought of slight value because of the
myriad situations that may develop.
34
From what has been said it is not to be inferred that the writer
believes the entire scope of the subject of nonverbal acts in their
relation to hearsay is in a state of chaos. Most of the questions that
arise in the classifications, hereinafter indicated, are determined by the
courts with remarkable dispatch, attended by no pitfalls. It is within
the periphery of a limited, although frequently encountered, area that
pandemonium holds sway. One further observation having to do with
nonverbal acts is perhaps worthy of note.
33. 78 Utah 105, 1 P.2d 954 (1931).
34. Falknor, supra note 12, at 209.
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3. Conduct as Ultimate or Probative Fact
It should be borne in mind that nonverbal acts or conduct may be:
(1) directly probative of an ultimate fact in issue, as where the
knowledge of the owner as to the vicious propensities of an animal is
in issue35 or (2) indirectly probative of an ultimate fact in issue, as
where testimony that a defendant, charged with the murder of an
FBI agent, had participated in a bank robbery was allowed.36 This
indirect probative use of conduct encompasses every conceivable kind
of mental state or condition.
4. Proof of Conduct Limited to Mental State
It is to be observed from the foregoing cases that whenever proof
of conduct (active or inactive) is offered in spite of the hearsay rule,
such proffered evidence performs its function if it tends to establish a
mental state or condition. To hold in addition that such proffered
evidence tends to establish the doing or not doing of an act in conse-
quence of such mental state or condition is to exceed the scope of proof
of the evidence. For example, in a criminal prosecution evidence is
offered of defendant's flight shortly after the commission of the alleged
offense. Insofar as this evidence is concerned, it has performed its
service by tending to establish the defendant's mental condition (fear)
-not guilt. Again, in a civil action, on direct examination W testifies
favorably for B, who called him as a witness. On cross-examination A,
the opponent, seeks to elicit testimony of a prior altercation between
the witness and himself. Such evidence is manifestly limited to
indicating the ill-feeling of the witness towards A. By the same token
in those cases wherein the quality of merchandise sold and delivered
is in issue, evidence that no complaints were made to the seller by
other buyers from the same lot or bulk raises a possible inference of
the mental state of such buyers that they were not dissatisfied with
the goods-not that the goods were of merchantable quality.
The fact that in many instances no harm results from ascribing to
such evidence of nonverbal acts (conduct) an additional inference,
such as the doing of an act in consequence of the mental state, does
not justfy the perpetration of the fallacy. There are instances, re-
peatedly exemplified in the realm of verbal acts, wherein such un-
warranted usage exerts a baleful influence.
From the foregoing observations, it is not to be implied, however,
that the proposition that an inference may not be based upon an
inference, convincingly exposed by Wigmore,37 is here advocated.
35. 2 WIGMORE § 251; 6 id. § 1770.
36. United States v. Puff, 211 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1954).
37. 1 WiGmoRE § 41.
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The circumstance that the proffered nonverbal or verbal act is
reasonably susceptible of more than one inference does not derogate
from the position here taken. If such proffered evidence is reasonably
probative of the mental state involved, the fact that it may also
warrant other inferences does not in and of itself demand exclusion.
To contend otherwise would be to ignore the principle that a proffered
act or assertion may be probative of one or more propositions. Let us
now proceed with a consideration of verbal acts.
III. VERBAL ACTS
The term "verbal acts," as the words imply, is used to designate
assertive acts, words (written or spoken), but with the limitation that
the truth of the matter stated is immaterial. Therefore, the rule
against hearsay does not apply to verbal acts.
The "verbal act doctrine" is usually applied in one of two situations:
(1) when the assertion is in itself directly probative of the ultimate
fact in issue or (2) when the assertion tends to explain an ambiguous
act. 38
1. Assertions Directly Probative of an Ultimate Fact
In a case where the terms of an oral contract are in issue, the
declarations of the parties at the time the alleged contract was
entered into are admissible as within the first classification; so also
the performance of a contract might demand an assertion, as where
"proofs of loss" are refused under an insurance policy.39 Here again
such proofs (written assertions) are illustrative of the category. Words
written or spoken in actions for libel and slander, respectively, are
also within the first group of cases. None of these instances raises the
question of hearsay. It is inconceivable that such evidence would have
the effect of proof of the truth of the assertion. The evidence not
being susceptible of contravening the rule against hearsay, no hearsay
exception need be considered.
2. Assertions Explaining an Ambiguous Act
When the proffered assertion tends to explain or elucidate an
ambiguous act a different situation is presented. 40 The equivocal
conduct or act must of course be material and must accompany the
assertion. Without deviating further than to point out Wigmore's
illuminating discussion 4' of the limitations attending this group of
38. 6 id. § 1770.
39. 6 id. § 1770.
40. 6 id. § 1772.
41. 6 id. §§ 1772-1785.
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verbal acts, let us examine them with a view of ascertaining their
status within this area of proof. A delivers ten dollars to B. The
question may arise as to whether the delivery was intended as a gift,
a loan, the payment of a debt, or for some other purpose. Accordingly,
W's testimony that A, upon handing over the money to B, said: "This
is in payment of the loan you made me," tends to clarify the nature
of the transaction.4 2 By the same token, upon the issue of adverse
possession, declarations of those in possession characterizing their
occupancy are received-not as testimonial assertions but merely to
throw light upon or give color to the occupancy.43 In a proceeding to
recover death benefits under workmen's compensation, the declaration
of the employee, a salesman, made the evening of and before the injury
with respect to the nature of his duties and the purpose of a trip was
admitted. This type of case is illustrative of the many approaches
employed by the courts in this penumbra of verbal acts. 44 The court
might properly conceive of the declaration as coming within the
hearsay exception of a present state of mind,45 although, as Wigmore
observes, it seems that the verbal-act area is the favored ground of
receiving these statements.
4 6
The cases are legion admitting statements explaining an ambiguous
act. Undoubtedly, Wigmore's outstanding contribution to the sub-
ject,47 ear-marking many of the pitfalls encountered and the way they
should be avoided has had a marked and stabilizing influence upon
the courts. Furthermore, an apparently increasing number of cases
bear witness to the influence he has exerted48 in broadening the scope
of the applicability of the spontaneous exclamation exception to the
hearsay rule, as well as extending the scope of operation of the verbal
act doctrine. There is a marked tendency to break away from the
shackles of the doctrine, notably with reference to the requirement of
contemporaneousness. And in dealing with the spontaneous ex-
clamation exception to hearsay, emphasis is now laid upon the
emotional influence aspect, rather than upon proximity of time with
relation to the event. Moreover, the startling event, essential to the
application of the spontaneous exclamation exception, need not be
relevant to the issue.49 Notwithstanding these encouraging trends,
there is much to be desired in the way of clarity in the decisions of
the courts.
42. 6 id. § 1777 n.4.
43. 6 id. § 1778.
44. Schmidt v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 243 Idaho 1307, 55 N.W.2d 227
(1952); Gassaway v. Gassaway & Owen, 220 N.C. 694, 18 S.E.2d 120 (1942)
(similar statement excluded).
45. 6 WIGMORE § 1725.
46. 6 id. § 1726.
47. 6 id. § 1772.
48. 6 id. §§ 1750 n.3, 1777 n.2.
49. 6 id. § 1753.
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The recurring use of the enigmatical phrases "res gestae" and "a
part of the res gestae" has added immeasurably to the confusion. A
customary employment of the former phrase is to denote a circum-
stance or event inseparably connected with the one at issue. For
example, in a prosecution for murder evidence of another crime in
the link of attendant circumstances was allowed.5 0 Such phraseology
is often misleading in cases within the borderland of hearsay and
verbal acts, including the circumstantial use of statements to indicate
a mental condition, hereinafter discussed. Frequently, it is impossible
to determine whether an exception to the hearsay rule is applied, or
the evidence is received despite the hearsay rule.
The time element of the statement probably accounts, in part at
least, for this indiscrimnate treatment at the hands of the courts. A
prerequisite of the verbal-act doctrine, as above noted, is that the
statement accompany the act or transaction in question; while the
spontaneous exclamation, as its name implies, usually must accompany
an event. And, of course it is possible that the declaration may fulfill
the requirements of a spontaneous exclamation, or for that matter
those of some other hearsay exception such as that of an existing state
of mind, as well as the prerequisites of the verbal-act doctrine, eluci-
dating an ambiguous act. B shoots A. A's exclamation while under
shock: "C, my son B shot me. I dislike him and as I am about to die,
I hand you my watch as a gift." In the homicide action against B,
A's declaration might be received under the following exceptions to
the hearsay rule: (1) a spontaneous exclamation; (2) a dying declara-
tion; (3) a declaration indicating a present state of mind, or (2) and
(3), depending upon attendant facts. Now then in the civil action by
A's personal representative to recover the watch from C, D, who was
present when A spoke to C, would no doubt be permitted to testify by
reason of the exceptions (1) and (3), and also to testify as to the
declaration accompanying the delivery of the watch by virtue of the
verbal-act doctrine. Moreover, in this last case, A's declaration of his
dislike for B might be considered by the court as indicating circum-
stantially his state of mind. Too much emphasis cannot be placed
upon the hypothesis that in each of these instances the attending facts
and circumstances play an indispensable role in the determination of
whether or not the declaration meets any one or more of the pre-
requisites of admissibility.
Illustrative of the latter situation is the case of United States v.
Mesarosh.5 ' There the defendants were charged with conspiring to
teach and advocate the overthrow of the United States Government by
force and violence. Admitting testimony that one of the defendants,
50. State v. Peters, 90 N.H. 438, 10 A.2d 242 (1939); see also 1 WIGMOn E
§ 218 n.1.
51. 223 F.2d 449 (3d Cir. 1955).
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prior to the period complained of, "instructed a class that revolution
could come about only by the violent otherthrow of the government,"
and permitting the witness to read certain passages from a book
which defendant had read to the class was upheld on the appeal.
Apparently, the court based its decisions on two grounds: (1) "on
the question of his intent," etc., the declarations indicated circumstan-
tially the declarant's state of mind; and passages from the book indi-
cated circumstantially the state of mind of defendant in consequence of
the assertion of another; (2) "to prove the objective fact of the Party's
teachings" probative of an ultimate fact in issue. What the court
did make crystal clear in that case, however, was that hearsay was
not involved. This determination was the all-important question to
be decided.
IV. CIRCUMSTANTIAL USE OF STATEMENTS TO PROVE STATE OF MIND52
When the mental state or condition of a person is brought into
question, an utterance (oral or written) may become probative either
(1) in proof of the mental state of a person in consequence of a state-
ment made by another, or (2) in proof of the declarant's mental state.
Manifestly, in either event the rule against hearsay is not offended
because the truth of the assertions is immaterial. The principle has
become axiomatic; nevertheless, disagreement often arises in its
application, as hereinafter indicated.
Under the previous classification of statements, mental condition
became essential to throw light upon an ambiguous act; while here
mental condition may be said to have probative value other than to
elucidate an ambiguous act.
Moreover, no fundamental distinction in principle exists between the
two groups of cases within this classification. Cases involving proof
of the mental condition of one person in consequence of the statement
of another are cited in support of a decision relating to the declarant's
own statement as indicative of his own state of mind, and vice versa.
Accordingly, in the ensuing discussions of the two groups of cases,
certain propositions stressed as being perhaps helpful in the solution
of problems arising under one group may be equally apposite in those
arising under the other. In fact, it may be said that most of the
observations hereinafter made are applicable to proffered evidence
generally within the whole gamut of this twilight zone of hearsay.
Nevertheless, the treatment of the propositions will be presented under
the above categories in the interest of graphic illustration.
52. 6 WIGMORE §§ 1788-1790.
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1. Proof of the State of Mind of One Person
in Consequence of the Assertion of Another
A. Substantive Law and Pleadings Differentiated from Rules of
Evidence.-A proper perspective of the exact setting, in relation to
the substantive law and pleadings, of evidence involving the circum-
stantial use of statements of one person as indicative of the mental
state of another by reason thereof, would seem essential to an intelligi-
ble approach to -the subject. The failure to make such a delineation,
and as an incident thereto to consider -the incidental effect of any
disabling factors, perhaps accounts for the occurrence of occasional
sophistries in the discussions of the cases. In any event, let us under-
take the delineation, not with the idea of criticising the positions
taken by others, but rather of determining what benefit, if any, may
be derived therefrom in the solution of problems within this orbit of
proof.
A communicated threat of the deceased in a homicide case where
evidence supporting the plea of self-defense is introduced is receivable
to indicate the mental state of the defendant at the time of the affray.
53
In such a case the substantive law affords the accused complete
exoneration for the taking of the life of the deceased if it is established
that at the time of the homicide the defendant had reasonable appre-
hension of death or great bodily harm at the hands of the deceased.
The mental state of defendant does not become material unless there
is some evidence of self-defense.5 4 Turning to the adjective law, we
find that the threat is logically probative of the probable mental state,
provided, of course, such threat was communicated, for otherwise it
would lack probative value on this issue.
B. Role Played by Disabling Factors.-The communicated threat
presupposes the following reactions of the defendant in consequence
thereof: (1) that he understood the words of the threat-its nature
and character; (2) that he remembered the threat at the time of the
assault; (3) that he then reasonably believed the deceased was about
to carry out the threat. Absence of any one of these mental reactions
would render the threat ineffectual. If the defendant did not under-
stand the words used by the deceased, or if from the surrounding
circumstances he thought they were made in jest, the threat would
have no efficacy. The threat would be lacking in probative value
because the defendant would not undergo the mental state (fear) of
great bodily harm or death in consequence of the deceased's assertion.
Unless there is some proof of the existence of one of these disabling
factors, however, the communicated threat is not excluded.
53. 2 id. § 247 n.1.
54. See note 51 supra.
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In an action against police officers for alleged false arrest and false
imprisonment, prior statements of a third person to the defendants
complaining of the plaintiff's activities were received "upon the ground
of probable cause."55 Under the substantive law, we find that the
establishment of "probable cause" is a complete bar to the plaintiff's
right of recovery. Information calculated to create an impression in
the minds of the defendants that the plaintiff was engaged in disobey-
ing the law to the extent that her arrest was warranted is logically
probative of the sufficiency of their apprehension in making the arrest
and imprisoning the plaintiff and, therefore, in the absence of some
rule of exclusion, is legally relevant. Even from a cursory examination
of some tabular analysis of rules of exclusion, we readily conclude that
the only possible rule to be considered is the analytic rule of auxiliary
probative policy designated as hearsay. But hearsay is no barrier, for
the reason that neither the substantive law dealing with materiality
nor the evidential rule of relevancy presupposes the truth of the
utterances (information) in question. Though analogous to the
prerequisites for admissibility of the communicated threat in the
homicide case, mentioned above, here the information presupposes
the following mental reactions in consequence thereof: (1) that the
defendants understood the information given; (2) that the defendants
remembered the information at the time of the arrest and of the
imprisonment; (3) that the defendants believed the information to be
true. The lack of any one of these factors would deprive the evidence
of any probative value. In the absence of extenuating circumstances,
these factors are assumed to exist, however.
Moen v. Chestnut,5 6 an action for damages arising out of an automo-
bile collision, presented the question as to whether the driver of one
of the cars involved should have been permitted to testify that, as she
approached the intersection where the collision occurred, her com-
panion stated that it was a dangerous one and enjoined the driver
to be careful. The ruling of the trial court, admitting the evidence,
was upheld on the ground that the driver of the car thereby derived
knowledge of the hazardous condition of the intersection. In a lucid
opinion, Justice Steinert points out the inapplicability of hearsay to
the companion's'statement. The sole use of the statement was to
establish knowledge of the character of the intersection on the part of
the driver of the car. Knowledge in this case was not directly pro-
bative of an ultimate fact in issue, as in the homicide and false arrest
cases; here it played the role of an evidentiary fact, which in turn was
probative of the ultimate fact of conduct. In brief, under the sub-
stantive law, knowledge in this case was not itself determinative of
55. Clark v. Alloway, 67 Idaho 32, 170 P.2d 425, 430 (1946).
56. 9 Wash. 2d 93, 113 P.2d 1030 (1941).
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an issue in the case; nevertheless, knowledge of the hazardous condi-
tion of the intersection was a factor to be taken into account with
reference to the probable conduct of the driver on being apprised of
such condition, the ultimate question being whether the driver of the
car exercised the degree of care of a reasonable, prudent person on
reaching and entering the intersection. And although the statement
is merely proof of an evidentiary fact, the factors to be reckoned with
are similar to those in the cases wherein belief and knowledge are
directly probative of an ultimate fact in issue. If the driver did not
understand the statement of her companion; or if the driver did not
remember it when they reached or entered the intersection; or if the
driver, upon reaching the intersection, did not believe the information
to be true-the existence of any one of these factors would destroy
the probative value of the assertion.
Inferences from the assertions in these illustrative cases to the
respective mental states in issue would perhaps afford no serious
grounds of difference between the cases; likewise, there would be
agreement as to the effect of the disabling factors. In other words,
these factors would be dealt with as exceptions rather than as condi-
tions precedent insofar as the inference of mental state is concerned.
Stated differently, the usual is normally assumed, rather than the
unusual.
Although the disabling factors are seldom articulated in reference
to the problem of admissibility, more often in considering the suffi-
ciency of the evidence for the jury to consider, it is here urged that
their status should not be lost sight of in a determination of the effect
of a proffered assertion as hearsay or as creating a hearsay danger.
To say that an argument based upon such a course of reasoning in
conjunction with the inferences to be gleaned from such an assertion
is in reality a matter of relevancy is beside the point, for here we as-
sume that neither materiality nor relevancy is involved.
C. Similarity of Reasoning Employed with Relation to Relevancy
and Rule of Auxiliary Policy.-There is, however, a close relationship
between the reasoning employed in determining relevancy and this
rule of auxiliary policy. Relevancy does not denote that the proffered
assertion is susceptible of but one inference; in order to pass over the
barrier of relevancy, if the submitted evidence reasonably raises a
probable inference of the fact sought to be proved, this should suffice.
There is no occasion to consider other inferences. Thus, where the
statement of one person is proffered in proof of the mental state or
condition of another in consequence thereof, the court is not called
upon to summon all probable inferences that may arise therefrom.
If the statement reasonably tends to indicate the mental state or
condition involved, that suffices insofar as relevancy is concerned.
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Similarly, when the court is confronted with hearsay or hearsay
dangers from such proffered statement, it should confine its investiga-
tion to such inference or inferences as are reasonably calculated to
arise therefrom. To indulge in other inferences not only serves no
useful purpose but invites excursions into the nebulous area of
unbounded speculation. Even though a liberal attitude toward in-
ferences should be called for, remote inferences of the unusual or
exceptional should not be resorted to. Otherwise, before the circum-
stantial use of mental state could be received, disabling factors, or at
least some of them, would have to be taken into account.
D. Lack of Materiality Does not Necessarily Warrant Exclusion of
Evidence.-The cases discussed should suffice to demonstrate the
hypothesis advanced that assertions of one person used to indicate the
mental state of another in consequence of them do not clash with
hearsay, because the truth of the matter asserted is not brought into
controversy. Furthermore, lack of materiality does not in itself
necessarily call for exclusion. Materiality outlines the scope of the
ultimate issues in the case. The court therefore might very properly
decline to receive evidence beyond the scope of such issues in order
to avoid the possibility of a confusion of issues and to prevent un-
necessary delay in the presentation of the cause. It does not follow,
however, that lack of materiality invariably warrants the exclusion of
evidence. Such evidence might be received despite the issues, as
where it is sought to impeach a witness, or where the evidence is
probative of some evidentiary fact as distinguished from an ultimate
fact. Thus the statement made by the occupant of the car with
reference to the dangerous character of the intersection she and her
companion were approaching was material under neither the sub-
stantive law nor the pleadings, insofar as the limited use for which
this evidence was admitted is concerned.
E. Testimonial Use May Overshadow Circumstantial Use.-Are there
situations where unwarranted testimonial use is likely to attach to
such an assertion so as to call for its exclusion? Suppose an issue is
raised as to whether the defendant entered into an oral contract to
employ the plaintiff to manage a business. The defendant takes the
stand in his own behalf and proposes to testify that some few days
prior to the time the alleged contract was entered into A told him
that: (1) the plaintiff had been convicted -the year before for reckless
driving; (2) the plaintiff had failed to suport his wife; (3) the
plaintiff had told him an untruth; (4) the plaintiff had embezzled
money from his former employer; (5) some months prior the plaintiff
had defrauded him in the sale of merchandise; and (6) the plaintiff had
recently stolen a car from a neighbor. In the absence of extenuating
circumstances, such as the defendant's belief that A was telling an
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untruth, would not most of the information thus imparted tend to
inhibit him from entering into the contract of employment with the
plaintiff? Hence, would not the inference arise that he did not enter into
such contract? All items after (1) and (2) and, perhaps, (3) would
certainly warrant such an inference. Furthermore, the truth of what
A said to the defendant is beside the point. We are not confronted
with hearsay, but is it not most probable that the jury would accept
such assertions for the illegitimate testimonial use? Would a caution-
ary instruction- suffice to limit the consideration of the assertions to the
mental state of the defendant in consequence of the assertions? To
simplify matters, we will say that items (1), (2), and (3) are con-
sidered as having too little probative value and are excluded. The de-
fendant seriously contends that if the remaining statements made to him
by A are withdrawn from the jury's consideration, he will be immeas-
urably harmed by thus being deprived of strong, cogent, and convincing
evidence. On the other hand, the plaintiff strenuously contends that
such evidence would be most harmful to him. It would amount to the
height of incredulity to assume that the jury would or could apply the
instruction of the court and consider the evidence for the legitimate
use solely, says the plaintiff. We will assume A is unavailable as a
witness. What choice has the trial judge between these conflicting
positions? It would seem that defendant's interest might be sub-
stantially protected in such a case by permitting him to testify that,
in consequence of information given him by A, which reflected upon
the plaintiff's desirability as an employee, he relied upon it and did not
enter into any contract with the plaintiff. The defendant's proffered
testimony as to the incidents having been presented to the court in the
absence of the jury, the plaintiff would have the opportunity of cross-
examining the defendant about them in open court if he so desired.
2. Mental State of Declarant Shown from His Own Statement
A. Scope of Investigation.-Attention is now focused upon the other
circumstantial use of statements-to indicate the declarant's own men-
tal condition. Consciousness, belief, good faith, insanity, and in-
numerable other states of mind are illustrative of mental states or
conditions often sought to be established circumstantially by use of
the speaker's assertions. Every conceivable kind of mental state is
encompassed within the rule. And as no formula appears to have
evolved for the treatment of any particular mental state, an attempted
classification on the basis of mental states would be valueless. Our
investigation lies first in ascertaining whether these utterances are
likely to infringe upon the rule against hearsay directly or indirectly;
secondly, in instances where the hearsay rule is involved, and there-
fore all the dangers it is designed to guard against are present, in
determining what measures, if any, may be of practical value in the
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.solution of the problem of admissibility. Manifestly,% there are,
innumerable instances where these utterances raise noserious question
of hearsay or of a hearsay danger.
In an action by a husband for alienating the affections of a wife,
testimony of witness is offered that a short time prior to the occur-
rences in question, the husband told him that the wife continuously
nagged him. Would the hearsay aspect of the statement warrant
its exclusion?
Sanity being an issue, the declaration of the person in question;
"I am the Emperor of China," would probably be accorded circum-
stantial use without serious opposition.57
The plaintiff seeks damages for being wrongfully accused of the
theft of a car. W testifies that subsequent to the time when the
slanderous remark was alleged to have been made about the plaintiff,
he heard A, a third person, say, at a gathering of people, that the
plaintiff had stolen a car. The declaration would no doubt be admitted
on the question of the extent of damages sustained by the plaintiff.
In order to account for his failure to report a burglary because of
fear, the prosecuting witness was allowed to testify that he had told
his wife not to say anything about the matter.58 Here again, the
legitimate circumstantial use of the assertion to indicate the state of
mind of the speaker is manifest. In fact, the circumstantial use of
such assertions, perhaps, invites no serious opposition. There are
instances, however, that have evoked much divergency of views and
discussion.
B. Wright v. Tatham Reviewed.-Wright v. Tatham 9 furnishes a
classical illustration of a case that has provoked widely divergent
views. It will be recalled that, on the issue of sanity, certain letters
addressed to the testator, Marsden, were offered in evidence. The act
of sending the letters was discussed in the treatment of nonverbal acts;
now let us examine the contents of the letters from the aspect of
whether or not they reflect the mental state of their writers as to the
sanity or mental capacity of Marsden. One of the letters offered
conveyed an express hope of Marsden's good health; another requested
Marsden to instruct his attorney to proceed with the settlement of a
dispute; and the third expressed appreciation for favors conferred.
It is apparent that in the normal course of events, letters of this
character would not be sent to a person, mentally deranged. The
case may be viewed from two aspects: (1) the. act of sending the
letters, (2) the assertions in the letters. Suppose it was established
57. See, howeiver, Hinton, State of Mind and the Hearsay Rule, 1 U. CHI.
L. REv. 394, 398 (1934); see also Morgan, Hearsay and "Non-Hearsay, 48 HAIv.
L. REv. 1138, 1143 (1935).
58. The Queen v. Gandfield, 2 Cox Crim. Cas. 43 (1846).
59. See Seligman, supra note 3; Maguire, The Hilmon Case-Thirty-three
Years After, 38 HARV. L. REv. 709 (1925).
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that one of the letters had not been sent because it had been misplaced
and was not found until after Marsden's death. How would this affect
the mental state of the writer as reflected by the assertions in the
letter? Not at all. Does it not follow, therefore, that the contents of
the letters have significance separate and apart from the act of
sending?
Baron Parke, in the Wright case, emphasized the acts of sending
the letters as controlling on the hearsay aspect of the case; neverthe-
less, he also stressed the hypothesis that the contents of the letters
in question, according to his view, amounted to the implied assertions
of the senders, respectively, as to their beliefs or opinion that Marsden
was sane. Application is made as follows:
[I]n this case the letters which are offered only to prove the competency
of the testator, that is, the truth of the implied statements therein con-
tained, were properly rejected, as the mere statement or opinion of the
writer would certainly have been inadmissible."'
What distinction, if any, exists between the contents of the letters
in this case and the statement of the prosecuting witness to his wife
asking her not to speak of the burglary? How do the statements in
these letters differ from the assertion of the husband in the alienation
of affections suit? Pretermitting for a moment the fact that the letters
were written many years prior to the execution of the will, which
would raise a serious question of relevancy, and assuming for the
moment that the letters were written immediately prior to the execu-
tion of the will, would not even then serious doubt arise as to their
probative value as indicating circumstantially a state of mind? Baron
Parke considered the contents of the letters as implied statements
that Mr. Marsden was sane. Is it not true that, while an implied
assertion may reflect a mental state of the speaker, it does not follow
that any assertion reflecting a mental state of the speaker necessarily
carries with it an implied assertion of that mental state? Take, for
example, the assertion of the prosecuting witness in the burglary case
enjoining his wife not to say anything about the crime; this assertion
indicated the state of mind of the prosecuting witness-fear-but did
it necessarily amount to an implied assertion that he was fearful?
A comes into possession of a valuable first edition of a noted work,
long since out of print. Needing money, he desires to sell the book.
He recalls that B, now living in a distant city, and whom he had not
seen nor heard from in years, was once interested in purchasing
first editions of the kind he has acquired. Thereupon, A writes B,
describing the book and inquiring whether he would be interested in
its purchase. A short time after A writes this letter, the question of
B's mental capacity is brought into issue with respect to a deed of
60. 7 Ad. & El. at 389.
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land executed by B about the time A's letter was written. The letter
is offered in support of B's mental capacity. It is contended that the
contents of the letter reflect circumstantially A's belief that B was
capable of handling his own affairs. From that belief, it is to be
inferred that B did have mental capacity. Is it not daily experience
for one to write to others without any thought as to the mental condi-
tion of the addressee? B's mental capacity to execute the deed was
material under the substantive law. Therefore, any evidence that is
logically probative of mental capacity is relevant. Does the letter
meet the minimum requirements of logical relevancy to prove the
mental state of B? Would not the court be disposed to say that the
inference would be wholly unwarranted under the facts? A, like any-
one else, reasonably assumes that the addressee is mentally competent
in the absence of information to the contrary. In the absence of some
showing that A, pursuant to a conversation or correspondence with B,
wrote the letter, the writing of the letter forms not the slightest basis
for the inference that A believed B to be of sound mind. In other
words, there is a total lack of probative force as to B's mental condi-
tion. The conclusion is inescapable, therefore, that the contents of the
letter are inadmissible because of lack of relevancy. But let us suppose
that the letter in our hypothetical case was considered relevant. Does
it follow that the hearsay rule would be applicable? No. This is true
because-in the ordinary course of events-the contents of the letter
would not be considered as constituting an implied assertion of A that
B was sane for the reasons above stated. And by like reason the
hearsay rule is inapplicable to the contents of the letters in Wright v.
Tatham because they did not imply an assertion that Marsden was
sane.
C. Circumstantial Evidence with Relation to Proof.-Even if the
letters in our hypothetical case reflected a mental state of A that B
was sane, would not this constitute a mere link in the chain of circum-
stantial evidence of mental state? Surely, relevancy does not require
that the complete gamut of proof of the ultimate fact be completed by
one item of evidence. Assume that the contents of A's letter is some
evidence of A's belief of B's sanity. It does not follow, however, that
the contents of the letter amount to direct proof of B's sanity. In
other words, standing alone-unless fortified by other evidence-it
could be withdrawn from the jury's consideration. The trial judge
might instruct the jury not to consider the contents of the letter as
evidence of B's sanity but only of A's mental state, which, together
with other evidence, might be considered by them on the ultimate
question of B's mental capacity. Both in the opinions of the courts,
as well as in the discussion of the cases by the authorities, there seems
to be a disposition in dealing with questions involving the circumstan-
1956 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
tial use of statements in proof of a mental state to overlook entirely
the proposition that there are many links in the chain of circumstantial
evidence.
D. When Circumstantial Use May be More Trustworthy than
Testimonial Use and Vice Versa.-Another argument repeatedly ad-
vanced is that if A in our hypothetical case would not be permitted to
testify to the bald fact that B was sane, a fortiori, the letter is not
receivable to prove that fact indirectly. This reasoning loses sight
of the circumstantial use involved, which is attended by a much
higher degree of trustworthiness than the testimony of A on the
stand that B was sane. This is so because the writing of the letter at
a time and under circumstances not connected with the controversy
relieves the statement therein of the possibility of having been made
with any intent to influence the proceedings in court. It is to
be assumed, of course, that A had the same opportunity of ob-
serving B before writing the letter as he had before testifying. In
the absence of evidence indicating such knowledge, the letter would
fare no better than the proffered testimony of the witness.
In both the burglary case and the alienation of affections suit the
statements were made before the actual case being tried had been
started and in both there were attendant circumstances which lead
one to believe that the declarant had knowledge of the subject of his
assertions from which the state of mind was inferred. The assertions
in these cases likewise are attended with a high degree of trustworthi-
ness.
E. Implied Use Distinguished from Circumstantial Use of State-
ments.-At this juncture, in order to clear the way for the ensuing
discussion, certain fundamental observations should be noted. The
direct or implied statement of an intention is an assertion of a present
state of mind-the narration of a fact-and when so presented ob-
viously constitutes hearsay. The word "implied" is used in the sense
of a direct implication as distinguished from the circumstantial use
of an assertion from which an inference of a state of mind is permissi-
ble. For example, the implied assertion "I am going to leave this
place tomorrow" is treated as the equivalent of "I plan to leave this
place tomorrow." But "I thoroughly dislike this place" illustrates
a circumstantial use of the assertion in proof of the declarant's plan
to leave. With these concepts clearly in mind, let us direct our
attention to a case that has not only provoked learned disputations,
but one that, although involving an exception to the hearsay rule,
seems admirably suited for the purpose of presenting some of the
difficulties, evolving from this area of the twilight zone of hearsay.
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F. The Hillmon Case Reviewed.-The case of Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Hillmon6l involved an action to recover on certain life insurance
policies issued upon the life of one Hillmon. Plaintiff contended that
the body of a man found at Crooked Creek, Kansas, was that of the
insured, Hillmon; defendants contended that it was not Hillmon, but
Walters. In short, the defendants charged that a gigantic fraud was
being perpetrated upon them. Hillmon they asserted was still alive.
Letters written by Walters from Wichita, Kansas, several days
before the body was found, one to his sweetheart, another to his
sister, both expressing his intention of going on a journey with a man
by the name of Hillmon, were declared admissible.
Mr. Eustace Seligman assailed the doctrine applied in the Hillmon
case as destroying the last vestige of hearsay.62 The gist of his argu-
ment is that a logical extension of the ruling there applied would
lead to the receipt of an expression of memory to prove a past act.
Professor Maguire,63 in a thought-provoking dissertation, takes issue
with Mr. Seligman's view on this point.
Doubtless the most engaging feature of that decision is the use of
the declaration of the writer to indicate his state of mind, which was
not directly probative of an ultimate question in the case. It seems
that in prior cases wherein declarations had been admitted to prove
the declarant's state of mind, such state of mind, in most instances at
least, had borne directly upon an ultimate fact in issue.64 To illustrate,
if Hillmon had written a letter expressing his intention to go to
Colorado and other places, no serious question would have been
raised with reference to the admissibility of the letter to indicate his
present state of mind-intent to go on a journey. However, we have
no fault to find with the decision as it relates to this aspect of the
case. Calling attention to this feature of that case is deemed es-
sential to a better understanding of other aspects there encountered
and now to be discussed.
Let us assume that under the substantive law it becomes material
to prove that A was in the Town of X on March 15. B's testimony that
a few days prior thereto A told him "I plan to go to X on March 15"
is received as evidence of A's mental state (intent to go to X on
March 15). Stop! The rule of evidence authorizing proof of a
mental state does not go so far as to authorize proof of A's act in going
to X. Obviously, from the establishment of the state of mind, an
inference is permissible that he did go. This is simple enough.
Frequently, however, A's declaration is treated as the equivalent of
direct evidence of his going to X. Remember, A's declaration is here a
61. 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
62. See Seligman, supra note 3.
63. See Maguire, supra note 59.
64. See note 59 supra.
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testimonial assertion in proof of an existing state of mind. Accord-
ingly, if the jury should believe that A was telling the truth, they
would not be permitted to infer that he went to X, certainly on the
strength of the assertion alone. The result should warrant the aban-
donment of the fallacious notion that a declaration of intent is evidence
of the act. Granting, however, that the elimination of the intermediary
step is readily accounted for by implication, i.e., that the jury must
find that A told the truth in making the declaration before they
could infer that he went to X and, that therefore, no serious harm is
likely to ensue from the erroneous hypothesis, we strongly contend,
nevertheless, that much of the confusion existing in and with refer-
ence to the discussion of cases in this area of proof is attributable
to the use of figurative terms and of inferences at the expense of the
actualities of the legal processes involved. Let us see if this is not so.
We take another look at the case where A's presence in the Town
of X on March 15 becomes material under the substantive law, and A's
prior declaration of his intention of being in X on March 15 is prof-
fered. The declaration of intent is logically probative of intent. From
the storehouse of general experience we find that the declaration of
a person of his intention to do an act in the absence of extenuating
circumstances indicates that he probably had the intent to do the
act. In other words, it is more reasonable to assume that he had
the intent than that he did not have it. Requirements of materiality
and relevancy interposing no obstacle, we turn now to see if some
rule of policy demands the exclusion of such a statement. A cursory
examination of a general classification of such rules discloses that the
analytical rule of auxiliary policy-hearsay-is the only one in any-
way applicable. 65 But, as we have observed, this rule affords no
barrier because of the exception to the hearsay rule relating to an
existing state of mind, and unlike the letters in the Hillmon case,
the declaration here did not raise any shadow of a hearsay danger
lurking in the background. In other words, statements in the letters
of Walters have been thought to imply an understanding on his
part with Hillmon66 that Hillmon had expressed his consent, perhaps,
for Walters to go with him. Accordingly, the formidable question
before the court, after noting that the statements in the letters fell
within the exception to the hearsay rule relating to present intent,
was whether or not an instruction by the court would have eliminated
the danger of the illegitimate use of Walter's statement. In all
probability such an instruction would have sufficed. There are of
course instances where such an instruction would not take care of
the illegitimate use. For example, in Shepard v. United States61
65. 1 WIGMORE xci.
66. See Maquire, supra note 59.
67. 290 U.S. 96 (1933). See also People v. Formato, 286 App. Div. 357,
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a declaration of the victim, Mrs. Shepard, that the defendant had
poisoned her was excluded irrespective of materiality, relevancy and
a possible hearsay exception. The court was convinced that the jury
would attach to the evidence an improper usage.
The court in the Hillmon case, however, after dealing with the
relevancy of the contents of the letters to indicate the state of mind,
and then, inferentially at least, applying the exception to the hearsay
rule based on necessity, proceeded to the seemingly unsound con-
clusion that "the letters were competent... as evidence that, shortly
before the time when other evidence tended to show that he went
away, he had the intention of going, and of going with Hillmon,
which made it more probable both that he did go and that he went
with Hillmon, than if there had been no proof of such intention.' 68
We repeat that the letters were merely evidence of intent. The court
was not called upon to discuss the various inferences to be drawn.
State v. Farnam69 presented an analogous situation to that in the
Hillmon case. There the defendant was charged with the murder
of a young girl whose body was found among the ashes of a burning
barn about three-quarters of a mile from her home. The declaration
of the victim on the evening of the homicide, refusing to go out with
the witness because she expected the defendant to call, was admitted
in evidence. And as in the Hillmon case, where the letters of Walters
were received in proof of his state of mind (intent), so here the
declaration was received for the same use. But at this juncture, it
is to be noted that, unlike in the Hillmon case, a vigorous dissenting
opinion urges that the declaration was the equivalent of a hearsay
assertion attributable to the defendant. According to this opinion, it
was not essential, in view of other evidence, to prove that the victim
was at home on the night in question and, consequently, the only
motive the prosecution could have had in insisting upon the introduc-
tion of the declaration was to persuade the jury that the defendant
informed the victim that he was coming to see her that night; that
he did call for her at the home; and that he induced her to go to the
barn with him.
The Hillmon decision is heavily relied upon in support of the re-
ceipt of the victim's declaration in the Farnam case. Disagreement
among text writers and authorities as to such declarations was noted
by the court, which pointed out that many considered them admissible
as part of the res gestae, others referred to them as verbal acts, and
still others characterized them as coming within an exception to the
hearsay rule. Apparently an exception to the hearsay rule was the
143 N.Y.S.2d 205 (3d Dep't. 1955); McQuage v. City of New York, 285 App.
Div. 249, 136 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1st Dep't. 1954).
68. 145 U.S. at 296.
69. 82 Ore. 211, 161 Pac. 417 (1916).
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favored ground, as in the Hillmon case, for the reception of the declara-
tion.
A summary comparison of the two cases with reference to the
possible theories that could have influenced or did influence the
courts, respectively, is indispensable to a proper evaluation of the
problem of the admissibility or exclusion of declarations of this
character, as presented in those cases. The court in the Farnam case
might have considered that the declaration did not meet the minimum
requirements of relevancy and excluded it on that basis. Moreover,
here also as in the Hillmon case, the court, after passing favorably
upon the question of relevancy and concluding that the hear-
say exception of present mental state was applicable, could have
justified exclusion if it thought the assertion justified an inference of
a prior assertion of intent on the part of another to the declarant,
creating thereby a hearsay danger quite apart from the mental state
of the declarant. And as we observed in the discussion of the Hillmon
case, the hearsay danger would not justify exclusion unless-not as a
rule of evidence but as one of practice-the court should determine
that the illegitimate use (inference of an assertion by another) of
the assertion would probably outweigh in the minds of the jury its
legitimate use to prove an existing state of mind of the declarant.
Mental state of intent or purpose is merely illustrative of the in-
numerable mental states that may be included within this exception
to the hearsay rule. For every circumstantial use of an assertion to
prove the mental state of the declarant, there is no doubt a corres-
ponding hearsay exception. The all-important question, never to be
lost sight of in the consideration of a statement to prove a mental state,
is whether it is a testimonial assertion or not.70 Unfortunately,
throughout this twilight zone of hearsay, no satisfactory conclusions
may be reached from the decisions. It is frequently impossible to tell
from a given opinion whether the assertion is dealt with as an
exception to the hearsay rule or is admitted despite that rule. Here
again, the employment of such phrases as "a part of the res gestae"
or "verbal acts" accompanied by an application that perhaps would be
more consonant with the theory of a circumstantial use of an assertion
to indicate the state of mind of the declarant only adds to the unsatis-
factory condition of the cases.71 Therefore, while the actual decisions
in this sphere are left wholly within the realm of conjecture, neverthe-
less, theoretically the line between the hearsay and nonhearsay use is
clearly drawn, as well as between the various aspects of the latter
70. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept,
62 HARv. L. REV. 177 (1948).
71. 6 WIGMORE §§ 1745, 1767; Hinton, supra note 1, at 400 n.20; Morgan,
A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE
L.J. 229 (1922).
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division. Let us proceed to take under advisement another group of
cases closely allied to those involving the circumstantial use of
declarations in proof of a mental state.
V. CIRCUMSTANTIAL USE OF STATEMENTS TO PROVE
IDENTITY OF TIME, PERSON OR THING
Proof of the identity of a person or thing affords another circum-
stantial use of utterances despite the hearsay rule, the truth of the
subject matter of the assertion not being called into question.7 2
Occasionally an assertion is made by a witness to identify a time when
an event took place or a place where it occurred. No ingenious argu-
ment is necessary in some cases to expose the testimonial use likely to
be accorded such an assertion by the jury and the highly prejudiced
effect resulting therefrom. For example, in a criminal prosecution
for the theft of a car, a witness for the prosecution on direct examina-
tion testifies that he is positive that the defendant was the man whom
he saw drive off with the car in question because the day before A
had pointed out the defendant to him as the man who robbed a bank.
A sharp conflict of testimony is presented from seemingly credible
witnesses for both the state and the defendant. Would anyone be so
credulous as to believe that the jury probably would or could limit
the consideration of this assertion to the proper use in compliance with
the directions of the court to do so? Would the application of the
theory of dual admissibility comport with the realities of the situation?
Should the crucial question be avoided by resorting to the trial court's
discretion? Even if such a course were pursued, would the admission
of the declaration constitute an abuse of discretion?
On the other hand, in many cases no formidable question arises upon
the offer of the declaration. In Kyzer v. State73 the defendant was
charged with robbery. To prove the time of the alleged offense,
testimony of witnesses that they had heard of the robbery or read
about it in a newspaper was admitted. Again, in an action on a policy
of life insurance, although certain hospital records, not shown to have
been kept within the requirement of the regular entries rule, were held
inadmissible to prove what the patient was treated for, these records
were allowed to show his attendance at the clinic on the dates men-
tioned therein.74 In a prosecution for the forgery of a check, the de-
fendant interposed the defense of an alibi. A sale order given the
defendant in another city on the day in question was admitted.75
72. 6 WIGMORE § 1791.
73. 250 Ala. 279, 33 So. 2d 885 (1947).
74. Harkins v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 154 Pa. Super. 387, 35
A.2d 754 (1944).
75. State v. Krout, 183 N.C. 804, 112 S.E. 23 (1922).
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With respect to the circumstantial use of such assertions to identify
a time, place or person, the judicial attitude is quite similar to that
toward the circumstantial use in proof of a mental state. Here the
question of identity in some manner becomes material to the issues of
the case, being either directly involved, as where in a criminal action
an alibi is injected as a defense, or indirectly involved as a corroborat-
ing circumstance tending to support the testimony of the witness.
Therefore, just as in the case of the circumstantial use to prove a
mental state, the assertion is here scrutinized to discover whether a
reasonable inference of identity may be drawn from it. If legal
relevancy is established, which, of course, implies that the assertion
tends to prove identity, we then turn to the evidential rules of policy.
And, as in the mental state cases, we conclude that the hearsay rule
is the sole one to be reckoned with. At this point, as in those cases
establishing a mental state circumstantially, the general experience of
mankind must be given due weight in order to find out the true effect
of the assertion. It is conceivable that here, too, some exception to
the hearsay rule might clear the declaration, such as the exception
concerning spontaneous declarations. 76 For example, if the identity
of the accused charged with murder is at issue, W's testimony that
within seconds after the firing of the fatal shot X, standing by him,
exclaimed, "There goes the man that shot the gun!" pointing to his
right, and that thereupon W, looking in that direction, caught sight of
the defendant a few yards distant as he passed a street light, hat off,
and gun in hand, would no doubt be allowed insofar as X's statement
is concerned as within the spontaneous exclamation exception to the
hearsay rule. The parallelism between the two classes of cases in
close proximity to hearsay seems complete when we further observe
that here, as in the mental state cases, the declaration constitutes only
a link in the chain of circumstantial evidence.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is suggested that the following observations be
considered with relation to cases occuring within this intriguing twi-
light zone of hearsay:
(1) Circumstantial use of a proffered act or assertion does not
necessitate that it fulfil the requirements of conclusive proof; it may
constitute a mere link in the chain of proof.
(2) It is possible, of course, for the proffered evidence to fulfill a
hearsay exception requirement, and at the same time meet the
prerequisites of one or more of the classes of evidence that are admissi-
ble despite the hearsay rule.
76. 6 WirMORE §§ 1749, 1755.
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(3) In passing upon the question of relevancy, the court is not called
upon to consider the numerous inferences which may be drawn from
the proffered evidence, but only whether it logically tends to prove an
ultimate fact or an evidentiary fact.
(4) In a case where the proffered evidence does not come within a
hearsay exception and some doubt is raised as to whether a testimonial
assertion is in fact involved, the court is called upon to consider
probable inferences from the proffered evidence.
(5) In thus making a determination as to whether or not the
proffered evidence is admissible in spite of the hearsay rule, the trial
judge's discretion should not enter the picture; the invocation of the
rule of discretion (1) adds to the onerous duties of the trial judge, and
(2) is calculated to engender a high degree of uncertainty. While in
innumerable instances, such as in passing upon the competency of an
expert witness, the rule of discretion serves a useful purpose, even
then in these and other situations involving discretion, frequently an
appellate court, ostensibly approaching the assignment of error from
the point of view of an abuse of discretion, will in effect review the
ruling just as if no discretion was involved.
(6) In passing upon a borderland situation of hearsay and nonhear-
say, it is here stressed that the trial judge should adopt the standard
of the reasonably intelligent person in dealing with the ordinary
affairs of life. Such a standard calls for the employment of the
doctrine of judicial notice with reference to indisputable matters
derived from experience; it is here that the consideration of suggested
classifications, such as the against-interest notion, and those alluded
to in outstanding contributions by McCormick, Morgan, Maguire,
Falknor and others, will be found of invaluable assistance to the
trial judge.
(7) Finally, in those instances where the proffered evidence has a
legitimate use but is like to be accorded an illegitimate one by the
jury, the trial judge, as a matter of law-not discretion-should weigh
the attendant facts and circumstances, again by the standard of the
reasonably intelligent person, to determine whether or not the illegiti-
mate use may be taken care of by instructions.
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